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Introduction  
One of the principal goals of health care reform is to 
provide affordable health insurance coverage to all 
Americans. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) contains provisions that will provide premium 
and cost-sharing assistance to low-income families. ACA 
provides premium assistance to families with income up 
to 400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) and 
cost-sharing assistance up to 200 percent of FPL (H.R. 
3590). Eligibility for this low-income assistance will not 
be dependent on an asset test. 
 
These low-income subsidy provisions in ACA do not 
apply to people receiving insurance coverage through 
Medicare. Instead, Medicare only offers financial 
assistance to low-income beneficiaries with incomes up 
to 150 percent of FPL through Medicaid, the Medicare 
Savings Programs (MSPs), and the Medicare Part D 
Low-Income Subsidy (LIS).1 Nonetheless, premiums and 
cost-sharing can still be burdensome for some low-
income beneficiaries who either do not qualify or apply 
for these programs or have large health expenditures, 
because Medicare does not have a limit on out-of-pocket 
(OOP) spending.2  In addition, current Medicare LIS 
programs can be complicated and confusing to many 
eligible beneficiaries, because the programs have 
different eligibility criteria resulting from differences in 
state rules and discrepancies between programs in how 
income and resources are computed. This confusion is 
evidenced by the low participation rates in some of these 
programs (Ebeler, Van de Water, and Demchack 2006; 
Government Accountability Office 2005). National health 
care reform could provide an opportunity to simplify and 
align these programs and to improve Medicare’s 
performance in serving low-income beneficiaries. 
 
This paper considers policy options to reform current 
Medicare low-income subsidies and extend low-income 
subsidies to beneficiaries up to 300 percent of FPL, 
more consistent with provisions in the health reform bill. 
Using the Urban Institute’s Medicare Benefits Simulation 
Model, we analyze new LIS options, coupled with a 
Medicare cost-sharing structure that has a unified 
deductible, uniform coinsurance, and limits on OOP 
spending, and estimate their impacts on program 
spending and beneficiary OOP spending. 
Policy Options  
Traditional Medicare includes Part A (hospital 
insurance), Part B (medical insurance), and Part D 
(prescription drug coverage).3  One striking feature of 
traditional Medicare is that, for Part A and Part B 
covered services, there is no limit on OOP spending 
and cost-sharing; in some cases, even increases with 
utilization. For example, in the case of hospitalization, 
in 2009, beneficiaries paid an inpatient deductible of 
$1,068, a copayment of $267 for days between 61 and 
90, $534 for days between 91 and 150, and full costs 
beyond 150 days. 
 
There are currently three mechanisms through which 
Medicare beneficiaries can qualify for assistance with 
premiums and cost-sharing: Medicaid, the three MSPs 
mentioned above, and the Medicare Part D LIS. Table 
1 shows the eligibility standards and benefits of these 
programs in 2006 (the year covered by the data used in 
this paper). Full Medicaid covers services beyond 
Medicare, pays for Part B premiums (and Part A 
premiums, if applicable), and pays for all cost-sharing. 
Qualified Medicare beneficiaries (QMBs) receive 
premium and cost-sharing subsidies similar to those 
provided through Medicaid, but no additional services. 
The Specified Low-income Medicare Beneficiary 
(SLMB) and Qualified Individual (QI) programs pay Part 
B premiums for eligible beneficiaries who choose to 
enroll. The Part D LIS provides premium and cost-
sharing assistance for prescription drug coverage. The 
eligibility criteria and benefits for Medicaid are largely 
determined by states, although federal law and 
regulations require states to cover certain low-income 
aged, blind, and disabled individuals. For the MSPs, 
the federal government sets the standards, but states 
have certain flexibility in determining the eligibility 
criteria and benefits. The Part D LIS program, on the 
other hand, is administered at the federal level by the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and has 
uniform rules regarding eligibility and benefits in all 
states. 
 
Recognizing the problems described above, various 
options have been suggested that would establish a 
unified annual Medicare deductible, uniform 
coinsurance, and limits on OOP spending 
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(Congressional Budget Office 2008); simplify and align 
eligibility criteria for low-income subsidy programs 
(Merlis 2005; Zuckerman, Shang, and Waidmann 
2010a); and provide a comprehensive Medicare 
benefits option or Medicare Extra (Part E) (Davis et al. 
2005). In fact, the Medicare Improvement for Parents 
and Providers Act of 2008 (H.R. 6331) took a major 
step toward coordinating the eligibility standards of 
MSPs with those of the Part D LIS.4 
 
A reformed LIS schedule would make more sense if it 
were combined with comprehensive cost-sharing 
reforms that included a unified deductible, uniform 
coinsurance, and stop loss protection. These types of 
reforms were considered by Zuckerman et al. (2010b), 
and this paper builds on that work. The earlier paper 
estimated the impacts of reformed cost-sharing (e.g., a 
unified deductible, uniform coinsurance, and limits on 
OOP spending) on program spending and beneficiary 
OOP spending. The low-income subsidy options we 
propose in this paper would take as a baseline the 
following reformed cost-sharing: an annual unified 
deductible of $1,000 for Part A and Part B covered 
services; a 20 percent coinsurance rate for Part A and 
Part B covered services, and a limit on OOP spending 
at $5,000 for Part A, Part B, and Part D covered 
services. In addition, the deductible and “doughnut 
hole” in Part D would be eliminated.5  Under ACA, the 
doughnut hole is gradually eliminated (as we do here), 
but the separate Part D deductible remains. 
We analyze two low-income subsidy options (table 2).6 
Option 1 retains resource requirements (asset tests) for 
the current eligibility groups and applies those for the 
partial Part D LIS to newly eligible groups, while Option 
2 eliminates the resource requirements as a condition 
of eligibility. In both options, we combine Medicaid and 
QMB, and these beneficiaries would neither pay 
premiums nor face cost-sharing under Medicare. 
Beneficiaries currently eligible for SLMB, QI, and Full 
or Partial Part D LIS would be combined into a single 
eligibility category; this group would not pay a premium 
and would have a deductible of $150, a coinsurance 
rate of 5 percent, and a limit on OOP spending 
protection of $1,000. Option 1 would also expand the 
LIS programs to beneficiaries up to 300 percent of 
FPL. Beneficiaries with income between 150 percent 
and 200 percent of FPL would pay one-third of full Part 
D and Part B (if applicable) premiums ($1,448). 
Beneficiaries with income between 200 percent and 
250 percent of FPL would pay two-thirds of full Part B 
and Part D premiums, and beneficiaries with income 
between 250 percent and 300 percent of FPL would 
pay full Part B and Part D (if applicable) premiums, 
while deductibles, coinsurance rates, and the limit on 
OOP spending gradually increase with income as well. 
By eliminating the resource requirements, Option 2 
means that more beneficiaries would be eligible at 
each level of income. Under both Option 1 and Option 
2, Medicaid would no longer play a role in the low-
income subsidy of Medicare beneficiaries.7 
Table 1: Current Program Eligibility Rules and Associated Benefits 
Program/Pathway Income standards Resource standards Notes 
Full  
Medicaid 
SSI 
74% of FPL for singles 
82% of FPL for couples 
$2,000 for singles 
$3,000 for couples 
209(b) states may have more  
restrictive standards; participants  
receive full Medicaid benefits and are 
deemed eligible for full Part D LIS. SSP State established 
$2,000 for singles 
$3,000 for couples 
Medically Needy State established State established 
Poverty-related 
coverage 
State established State established 
Long-term care-
related coverage 
State established State established 
Medicare 
Savings 
Programs 
QMB 100% of FPL 
$4,000 for singles 
$6,000 for couples 
Medicaid pays Part B premium (Part A 
premium if applicable) and cost-
sharing; participants are deemed  
eligible for full Part D LIS. 
SLMB 120% of FPL 
$4,000 for singles 
$6,000 for couples 
Medicaid pays Part B premium;  
participants are deemed eligible for full 
LIS. 
QI 135 percent of FPL 
$4,000 for singles 
$6,000 for couples 
Medicaid pays Part B premium subject 
to a state spending cap; participants 
are deemed eligible for full Part D LIS. 
QDWI 200% of FPL 
$4,000 for singles 
$6,000 for couples 
Medicaid pays Part A premium for  
returned workers; participants are 
deemed eligible for full Part D LIS. 
Part D 
Low  
Income 
Subsidies 
Full LIS 135% of FPL 
$6,000 for singles 
$9,000 for couples 
Participants pay zero premium and 
deductible with reduced copayment 
and coinsurance. 
Partial LIS 150% of FPL 
$10,000 for singles 
$20,000 for couples 
Participants pay reduced premium and 
cost-sharing. 
  Source: Merlis (2005) and Bruen, Wiener, and Thomas (2003). 
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Medicare Part D introduced the concept of true out-of-
pocket (TrOOP) expenses. The basic idea is that 
Medicare cost-sharing paid by supplemental health 
insurance plans does not count toward the OOP limit in 
the drug benefit. In this paper, we consider options 
both with and without TrOOP: That is, we alternatively 
do and do not count cost-sharing paid by supplemental 
insurance plans (including Medicaid). Using the TrOOP 
provision would reduce Medicare spending and 
increase beneficiary OOP costs because the limit on 
OOP spending would not start until beneficiaries 
reached a higher level of spending. We simulate the 
impacts of Option 1 and Option 2 with and without the 
TrOOP provision. 
 
 
Data and Methods  
In this paper, we use the Urban Institute’s Medicare 
Benefits Simulation Model to simulate the effects of 
alternative LIS options on Medicare spending and 
beneficiary OOP spending. We provide a detailed 
description of the model construction in an online 
appendix. A more concise description is presented 
here. 
 
Constructing a baseline and simulating the impacts of 
various policy options to restructure Medicare require 
information on health care expenditures, as well as 
eligibility and participation in the LIS programs. To the 
best of our knowledge, no single data source collects 
sufficiently detailed information to generate estimates 
for all of these factors. The Urban Institute’s Medicare 
Benefit Simulation Model relies on data from both the 
2006 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the 2004 
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) to 
construct a baseline reflecting the Medicare benefit and 
cost-sharing structure in 2006 and simulate the impacts 
of alternative reform options. 
 
The 2006 wave of the HRS is nationally representative 
of the noninstitutionalized population that is 53 years of 
age or older. The MCBS is a nationally representative 
sample of both aged and disabled Medicare 
beneficiaries, regardless of institutional status. To align 
the HRS sample frame with the MCBS, we dropped 
beneficiaries residing in nursing homes and those less 
than 53 years of age before matching with HRS. Both 
the HRS and the MCBS collect detailed information on 
demographics and health status. However, the MCBS 
lacks the detailed income and asset information 
required for modeling eligibility, and the HRS lacks 
detailed information on health care utilization and 
expenditures to simulate the effects of reformed cost-
sharing options. Our strategy is to combine these two 
data sources. For each respondent in the HRS, we find 
a statistical match from the MCBS and assign the 
expenditure profile of the matched MCBS respondent 
to the HRS respondent. 
 
The match between the HRS and the MCBS is based 
on variables common to both data sets, including age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, education, region, urban/rural, 
supplemental coverage, self-reported health status, 
disability, chronic conditions (hypertension, cancer, 
heart disease, lung disease, diabetes, and stroke), and 
number of chronic conditions. Supplemental insurance 
was defined using the following categories: current 
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) coverage, 
Medicaid coverage, retiree ESI coverage (also 
including private managed care, other private 
coverage, and TRICARE), Medicare managed care, 
Medigap coverage, and no supplemental coverage.8 
The entire expenditure profile of the matched MCBS 
respondent was assigned to the corresponding HRS 
respondent. As a result, we have both eligibility status 
and detailed health care spending for each individual in 
the matched HRS sample. 
 
The matched HRS-MCBS data contain information to 
simulate eligibility for LIS programs at the beneficiary 
level and health care utilization and expenditures at the 
medical event level. Several adjustments were made to 
the matched data to reflect the structure of the 
Medicare program in 2006 that were not reflected in 
the source data from 2004. Specifically, we applied 
 Table 2: Policy Options for Reforming Medicare Low Income Subsidy Programs 
Low Income Subsidy  
Option 1  
(with Asset Test) 
Low Income Subsidy 
Options 2  
(No Asset Test) Premium 
Deductible  
($) 
Part A  
Coinsurance 
Part B  
Coinsurance 
Stop Loss 
($) 
Medicaid/QMB Less than 100% FPL Zero 0 0% 0% 0 
SLMB/QI/FullRx/PartialRx 100-150% FPL Zero 150 5% 5% 1000 
150-200% FPL 150-200% FPL 1/3 of Full Premium 250 10% 10% 2000 
200-250% FPL 200-250% FPL 2/3 of Full Premium 500 10% 10% 3000 
250-300% FPL 250-300% FPL Full Premium1 750 15% 15% 4000 
Ineligible More than 300% FPL Full Premium 1000 20% 20% 5000 
Low Income Subsidy 1: For beneficiaries with income between 150-300% FPL, an asset limit of $10,000 for singles and $20,000 for couples 
are also applied for eligibility. 
Low Income Subsidy 2: This option eliminates the asset test for subsidies including the Part D low income subsidies. 
1 Medicare Part B premium was $1,062 and premium for standard Part D benefit plan was $386.4 in 2006.    
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current rules for the LIS programs, and simulated the 
presence of prescription drug coverage under Part D, a 
new benefit in 2006. Finally, we imputed Medigap 
premiums and retirees’ share of premiums for 
employer-sponsored coverage, which are not routinely 
reported on the HRS or MCBS. All estimates were 
adjusted to 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index.  
 
Given a 2006 baseline, we applied alternative cost-
sharing rules and LIS programs to the expenditure 
profiles in the baseline to simulate their impacts on 
Medicare spending and beneficiary OOP spending. For 
beneficiaries with Medicaid as their supplemental 
coverage, we did not observe Medicaid payment rates 
and were required to assume Medicaid paid full cost-
sharing under the alternatives outlined in Option 1 and 
Option 2. In reality, Medicaid generally would pay less 
under the baseline because Medicaid payment rates in 
most states are lower than Medicare payment rates.9 
Under reformed cost-sharing for Option 1 and Option 2, 
we assume cost-sharing for Medicaid based on 
bringing payment rates to Medicare levels. We did not 
incorporate the effects of changes in cost-sharing on 
spending for Medicare-covered services, including 
prescription drugs, in order to focus our analysis on 
changes in the distribution of spending between the 
program and beneficiaries.10  Each simulation shows 
how Medicare spending, beneficiary cost-sharing, and 
other sources of spending would be altered by different 
reform options. 
 
The study sample in this paper includes all 
beneficiaries except those who were institutionalized, 
younger than 53 years of age, and with Medicare as 
secondary payer. The final sample consists of 10,636 
individuals, representing 37.2 million Medicare 
beneficiaries, among whom about 6.0 million enrolled 
in Medicare Advantage. In the simulation, we assume 
that the benefit package for Medicare Advantage 
enrollees remains the same and there is no behavioral 
response to the reforms throughout the simulation. 
Although the focus of this paper is Medicare fee-for-
service enrollees, we provide estimates for the 
premium subsidies to Medicare Advantage enrollees 
under the baseline and reform options. 
 
 
Results 
We focus our attention on the results without the 
TrOOP provision and then briefly discuss the impacts 
of adding the TrOOP provision at the end of the 
section. Table 3 shows simulated Medicare and 
beneficiary OOP spending (cost-sharing, program 
premiums, and supplemental insurance premiums) 
under the baseline and alternative LIS options across 
all fee-for-service beneficiaries. All estimates in the 
table are averaged across beneficiaries with Medicaid, 
supplemental coverage through an employer, or 
Medigap and those without any supplemental 
coverage. 
 
The top panel shows that, under the baseline, mean 
spending for Medicare-covered services was $9,323 (in 
2006 dollars), with $6,808 paid by Medicare, $722 paid 
by the beneficiary, and $1,792 paid by other sources, 
including Medicaid and other supplemental insurers.  
 Table 3: Simulated Effects of Alternative Low Income Subsidy Options,1 in 2006 Dollars 
  Without TrOOP
2  With TrOOP 
  Baseline 
Reformed 
Cost-
sharing  Option 1 Option 2   
Reformed 
Cost-
sharing  Option 1 Option 2 
  Spending for Covered Services at Point of Service 9,323 9,323 9,323 9,323  9,323 9,323 9,323 
Medicare 6,808 6,816 7,158 7,370  6,028 6,468 6,716 
Beneficiary 722 760 675 606  908 812 736 
Other payers 1,792 1,747 1,490 1,347   2,387 2,044 1,872 
  Premium Contributions                
Medicare 265 221 420 525  264 465 572 
Parts B/D low-income subsidies3 62 62 263 380  62 263 380 
Part D employer subsidies 203 159 157 145  202 202 192 
Beneficiary 1,496 1,537 1,462 1,301  1,711 1,627 1,451 
Part B/D 1,020 1,020 973 861  1,020 973 861 
Contributions to ESI supplemental 222 195 189 173  274 267 247 
Medigap premium 254 322 300 267   417 387 343 
  Change in total Medicare spending - -36 505 822  -781 -140 215 
  Change in beneficiary OOP spending - 79 -81 -311   401 221 -31 
1 Fee-For-Services beneficiaries only. 
2 True Out-Of-Pocket (TrOOP) expenses: expenses paid by supplemental insurance plans including Medicaid do not count toward the  
stop-loss limit.  
3         In the simulations of Baseline and Reformed Cost-sharing, Medicare Savings Program subsidies ($153 per FFS beneficiary) are not  
         included in the Medicare premium contribution. 
Source: Urban Institute 2006 Medicare Benefits Simulation Model. 
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The middle panel shows that through subsidies to 
employers and low-income beneficiaries, Medicare 
contributed $265 per beneficiary to Part B and Part D 
premiums. The mean beneficiary share of Part B and 
Part D premiums was $1,020, and beneficiary 
payments toward ESI and Medigap premiums 
averaged, across all fee-for-service beneficiaries, $222 
and $254, respectively.  
 
Reformed Medicare cost-sharing (Zuckerman et al. 
2010b), combined with current LIS programs, would 
have relatively small impacts on Medicare spending, 
beneficiary cost-sharing, and other sources of 
spending (table 3, column 2, top panel). On average, 
reformed cost-sharing would reduce total Medicare 
spending (summation of changes in Medicare spending 
and Medicare premium subsidies) by $36 per fee-for-
service beneficiary (less than 1 percent) and increase 
beneficiary OOP spending (summation of changes 
premium contributions and point of service cost-
sharing) by $79 (less than 4 percent). 
 
Compared to reformed cost-sharing under current low-
income protections, Option 1 would increase Medicare 
spending for covered services by $342 (to $7,158), 
reducing beneficiary cost-sharing by $85 and lowering 
other sources of spending by $257 (table 3, column 3, 
top panel). These spending reductions would result in 
slightly lower beneficiary payments for ESI and 
Medigap premiums and slightly lower Part D employer 
subsidies. Including both the consolidation of MSP 
subsidies paid by Medicaid ($153 per beneficiary on 
average; not shown) for dual eligibles and increases in 
Part D low-income subsidies for nondual beneficiaries, 
Option 1 would increase Medicare subsidies to low-
income beneficiaries by $201, from $62 in the baseline 
to $263. Compared to the baseline, total Medicare 
spending, on average, would increase by $505 per fee-
for-service beneficiary, and beneficiary OOP spending 
would decrease by $81.11 
 
Option 2 (table 3, column 4)—which has the same LIS 
schedule as Option 1 but eliminates resource 
requirements—would make more people eligible for 
low-income subsidies. This would further increase 
Medicare spending, and reduce beneficiary cost-
sharing and other sources of spending. Compared to 
Option 1, Option 2 would increase low-income 
premium subsidies by $117 per fee-for-service 
beneficiary. On average, total Medicare spending 
would increase by $822 (about 12 percent), and 
beneficiary OOP spending would decrease by $311. 
 
Tables 4 through 6 present the distributional effects of 
the LIS options by income, health status, and baseline 
spending, respectively. Table 4 shows that baseline 
Medicare spending decreases with income, ranging 
from $8,924 for beneficiaries with income less than 100 
percent of FPL to $5,410 for beneficiaries with income 
more than 300 percent of FPL. Beneficiary cost-sharing 
is lowest for those with income less than 100 percent of 
FPL ($562), although Medicare spending is highest 
among beneficiaries in this group; beneficiary cost-
sharing is highest for those with income between 150 
percent and 300 percent of FPL ($805). In the 
baseline, however, low-income beneficiaries had a 
higher average cost-sharing to income ratio 
(beneficiary cost-sharing divided by income) than 
beneficiaries with incomes more than 300 percent of 
FPL. Option 1 (without TrOOP) would reduce           
cost-sharing for beneficiaries with incomes less than 
100 percent of FPL from $562 to $477, a decrease of 
 Table 4: Simulated Effects of Alternative Low Income Subsidy Options by Income,1 in 2006 Dollars 
      Without TrOOP
2  With TrOOP 
  Baseline   
Reformed  
Cost-sharing Option 1 Option 2   
Reformed 
Cost-sharing Option 1 Option 2 
  Medicare spending          
Less than 100% FPL 8,924  8,519 9,543 9,863  7,825 9,272 9,670 
100-150% FPL 7,155  7,060 7,516 7,899  6,367 6,910 7,436 
150-300% FPL 6,647  6,791 7,003 7,234  5,941 6,171 6,392 
More than 300% FPL 5,410   5,569 5,569 5,569   4,743 4,743 4,743 
  Beneficiary Cost Sharing            
Less than 100% FPL 562  687 477 350  781 528 384 
100-150% FPL 715  799 662 535  936 785 632 
150-300% FPL 805  816 754 690  984 919 858 
More than 300% FPL 718   704 704 704   866 866 866 
  Premiums          
Less than 100% FPL 816  835 798 614  902 862 672 
100-150% FPL 1,399  1,458 1,346 1,063  1,624 1,501 1,205 
150-300% FPL 1,698  1,751 1,643 1,474  1,954 1,836 1,651 
More than 300% FPL 1,726   1,755 1,726 1,670   1,960 1,923 1,853 
1 Fee-For-Services beneficiaries only. 
2 True Out-Of-Pocket (TrOOP) expenses: expenses paid by supplemental insurance plans including Medicaid do not count toward the 
stop-loss limit.  
Source: Urban Institute 2006 Medicare Benefits Simulation Model. 
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$85. The reductions in beneficiary cost-sharing 
become gradually smaller moving up the income 
distribution.12 Option 2 would reduce beneficiary cost-
sharing by $212, $180, $115, and $14, respectively, for 
beneficiaries at each level of income presented. 
 
Table 5 shows that Option 1 and Option 2 (without 
TrOOP) would reduce the cost sharing of beneficiaries 
in poor health by $181 and $271, respectively, 
compared to increases of $48 and $13 for those in 
excellent health.  The reductions in premiums are 
smaller, in percentage terms, relative to cost sharing, 
because gains are averaged across all beneficiaries in 
calculating ESI and Medigap premiums. Table 6 shows 
that annual cost sharing under the baseline (top panel) 
ranged from $10 in the bottom decile to $2,892 in the 
top decile.  Both Option 1 and Option 2 would provide 
greater protections for those with high cost-sharing. 
Option 1 would reduce cost-sharing in the top decile to 
$2,119, a reduction of $773, but increase it by $36 to 
$46, in the bottom decile; Option 2 would reduce cost-
sharing in the top decile by $996, but increase it by $35 
in the bottom decile.  The bottom panel of Table 6 
reports on the effects of the policy options on total out-
of-pocket spending (including premiums) and the 
results are consistent with the findings for cost-sharing. 
 
Adding the TrOOP provision means that payments 
from other sources such as Medigap, Medicaid, and 
ESI would not count toward the OOP spending limit. In 
all tables, the TrOOP provision would result in lower 
Medicare spending, higher beneficiary cost-sharing, 
and higher spending from other sources. This occurs 
because TrOOP delays the OOP spending protection 
from taking effect until the beneficiary reaches a higher 
level of total Medicare spending. The TrOOP provision, 
however, would have larger impacts on beneficiaries in 
poor health and with high OOP spending, because 
these people have higher levels of spending and, as 
such, higher cost-sharing obligations. Part B and Part 
D premiums are not affected by TrOOP because the 
TrOOP provision would not change Part B and Part D 
premium subsidies.  
   
 
Discussion  
A reformed LIS program would provide better 
protection to low-income beneficiaries and 
beneficiaries with the greatest health care needs. As 
the results show, low-income beneficiaries, 
beneficiaries in poorer health, and beneficiaries in the 
upper spending deciles benefit the most from these 
reform options. In addition, these reform options would 
greatly simplify the current system and could potentially 
increase program participation. For example, evidence 
suggests that eliminating resource requirements would 
increase participation in LIS programs (Glaun 2002; 
Hoover, Khatutsky, and Haber 2002).  
 
An important aspect of reforming the LIS program is its 
implications for overall program spending. Without the 
TrOOP provision, Option 1 would increase total 
Medicare spending by $504 per fee-for-service 
beneficiary while reducing Medicaid spending by $238. 
Overall public spending would increase by $266 per 
fee-for-service beneficiary.13  All told, Option 1 would 
result in an increase in total public spending of about 
$9.1 billion, or 2.4 percent of the $376 billion Medicare 
spent in 2006.14  Option 2 without TrOOP would 
 Table 5: Simulated Effects of Alternative Low Income Subsidy Options by Health Status1, in 2006 Dollars 
      Without TrOOP
2  With TrOOP 
  Baseline   
Reformed 
Cost-sharing Option 1 Option 2   
Reformed 
Cost-sharing Option 1 Option 2 
  Medicare spending          
Excellent 3,078  2,874 2,987 3,112  2,561 2,707 2,831 
Very good 4,101  3,953 4,070 4,216  3,493 3,629 3,792 
Good 5,674  5,629 5,860 6,055  5,001 5,270 5,478 
Fair 8,961  9,071 9,584 9,884  8,073 8,725 9,084 
Poor 13,693   14,105 15,029 15,302  12,298 13,606 13,992 
  Beneficiary Cost Sharing             
Excellent 446  511 494 459  560 540 506 
Very good 562  595 567 520  675 646 597 
Good 723  773 709 646  888 822 757 
Fair 878  904 766 666  1,090 943 831 
Poor 922   942 741 651   1,315 1,046 928 
  Premiums          
Excellent 1,679  1,738 1,661 1,506  1,946 1,857 1,686 
Very good 1,656  1,708 1,644 1,484  1,908 1,835 1,660 
Good 1,554  1,597 1,516 1,355  1,774 1,684 1,510 
Fair 1,358  1,392 1,313 1,135  1,545 1,457 1,268 
Poor 1,159   1,184 1,111 970   1,306 1,227 1,077 
1 Fee-For-Services beneficiaries only. 
2 True Out-Of-Pocket (TrOOP) expenses: expenses paid by supplemental insurance plans including Medicaid do not count toward the  
stop-loss limit.  
  Source: Urban Institute 2006 Medicare Benefits Simulation Model. 
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increase total public spending by $20 billion. Adding 
the TrOOP provision essentially eliminates Medicare’s 
additional costs, but shifts costs to some beneficiaries. 
Option 1 with TrOOP would actually reduce total public 
spending by nearly $11 billion, while Option 2 with 
TrOOP would have a very small impact on total public 
spending (an increase of $0.7 billion). 
 
The impacts on program costs vary by the design of 
the LIS program. In addition, higher participation and 
changes in supplemental insurance status could add 
program costs to certain options. There are several 
potential ways for the federal government to finance a 
reformed LIS program: (1) by requiring maintenance of 
effort by states that otherwise would see Medicaid 
spending reduced; (2) by redistributing costs across 
beneficiaries so that low-income beneficiaries and 
beneficiaries with the greatest health care needs 
receive better protection; (3) by raising additional 
revenue through, for example, a premium increase for 
high-income beneficiaries; or (4) by some combination 
of these methods.  
Our results, however, do not take into account the 
impacts of the potential changes in program 
participation, primarily because of the lack of solid 
estimates on the magnitude of the impacts, given that 
the evidence was mostly drawn from case studies and 
surveys that were intended to explain why eligible 
beneficiaries do not enroll (Glaun 2002; Hoover, 
Khatutsky, and Haber, 2002). In addition, we assume 
no behavioral response to the policy changes and, as a 
result, beneficiaries retain the same supplemental 
insurance status as in the baseline. This assumption 
helps us to simplify the modeling exercise. We 
recognize that some beneficiaries might switch to 
another supplemental status, which could alter our 
estimates. For example, with comprehensive reformed 
cost-sharing in Medicare and a restructured subsidy 
program, there may be less need for supplemental 
coverage such as Medigap, especially with the TrOOP 
provision under which cost-sharing paid by 
supplemental coverage does not count toward the limit 
on OOP spending. Some beneficiaries who currently 
enroll in Medicare Advantage to obtain lower cost-
sharing and a limit on OOP spending may find the 
reformed fee-for-service program more attractive.  
 
This paper, instead of simulating the impacts of a full 
range of LIS options, provides examples of the types of 
options that might be considered and a framework to 
evaluate these options. The method proposed here 
could help in striking a balance between program costs 
and providing adequate assistance to low-income 
Medicare beneficiaries.  
 Table 6: Simulated Beneficiary Spending by Deciles of Beneficiary Spending at the Baseline,1 in 2006 Dollars 
 Beneficiary Cost Sharing  
      Without TrOOP
2  With TrOOP 
Decile Baseline   
Reformed 
Cost-sharing Option 1 Option 2   
Reformed 
Cost-sharing Option 1 Option 2 
1 10  116 46 45  133 46 45 
2 86  178 74 71  215 74 71 
3 172  310 181 168  334 184 172 
4 269  385 281 255  417 297 270 
5 387  530 471 426  549 491 443 
6 520  601 565 514  641 605 554 
7 674  792 763 679  862 832 751 
8 902  1,010 966 869  1,181 1,134 1,031 
9 1,315  1,372 1,287 1,136  1,680 1,594 1,432 
10 2,892   2,308 2,119 1,896   3,070 2,862 2,589 
 Beneficiary Out-Of-Pocket Spending 
      Without TrOOP  With TrOOP 
Decile Baseline   
Reformed 
Cost-sharing Option 1 Option 2   
Reformed 
Cost-sharing Option 1 Option 2 
1 81  275 5 5  347 6 5 
2 1,026  1,188 834 700  1,248 870 734 
3 1,620  1,712 1,601 1,445  1,840 1,725 1,563 
4 1,794  1,898 1,809 1,623  2,040 1,950 1,756 
5 1,981  2,090 2,005 1,791  2,255 2,172 1,950 
6 2,197  2,294 2,223 1,994  2,516 2,446 2,213 
7 2,499  2,607 2,499 2,236  2,963 2,851 2,574 
8 2,893  3,129 2,993 2,646  3,621 3,472 3,089 
9 3,304  3,512 3,336 2,990  4,100 3,892 3,500 
10 4,789   4,279 4,074 3,636   5,259 5,008 4,494 
1 Fee-For-Services beneficiaries only. 
2 True Out-Of-Pocket (TrOOP) expenses: expenses paid by supplemental insurance plans including Medicaid do not count  
toward the stop-loss limit.  
  Source: Urban Institute 2006 Medicare Benefits Simulation Model 
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Endnotes  
1. Medicaid and the MSPs provide premium assistance 
to beneficiaries up to 135 percent of FPL and cost-
sharing assistance up to 100 percent of FPL, and the 
Medicare Part D LIS provides premium and cost-
sharing assistance to beneficiaries up to 150 percent 
of FPL, conditioned on their meeting the 
corresponding resource requirements. All 
beneficiaries receive subsidies for the basic Medicare 
premiums.  
2. Limits on OOP spending would be available in the 
health reform plans and in typical plans offered in the 
private insurance market.  
3. Medicare Advantage (Part C) is required to cover all 
traditional benefits, but may have an enhanced 
benefit structure provided by private insurance 
companies. 
4. The legislation uses the LIS asset standards for both 
LIS and MSPs as a way to expand eligibility for the 
MSPs and to potentially increase participation in the 
MSPs by reducing their administrative burden and 
costs. 
5. “Doughnut hole” refers to the gap in Part D coverage 
after a beneficiary exceeds the initial coverage limit of 
$2,830 (in 2010) in total expenditures up to the point 
where OOP expenditures reach $4,550. For 
expenditures in this range, the beneficiary is 
responsible for the full cost of prescription drugs.  
6. Option 1 and Option 2 incorporate legislative changes 
from the Medicare Improvements for Patients and 
Providers Act of 2008, while the baseline and 
reformed cost-sharing are based on program rules in 
2006. 
7. Alternatively, Medicare could require a maintenance 
of effort on the part of state Medicaid programs as a 
way of offsetting the costs of this enhanced Medicare 
low-income benefit. 
8. If more than one type of supplemental coverage was 
identified, we assigned the type of supplemental 
coverage to the respondent based on a hierarchy that 
gave precedence to ESI and followed the order of 
coverage as shown in the text. For example, a 
respondent who reported ESI and Medicaid was 
assigned ESI. 
9. Medicare pays providers according to its payment 
methods and rates. In principle, Medicaid pays the 
associated cost-sharing. However, the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 clarified that state Medicaid 
programs are not required to pay the full cost-sharing 
amount so long as their payment policies are written 
in their state plan. States are free to cap their liability 
so that providers receive no more than the state 
would have paid if the beneficiary only had Medicaid. 
For example, suppose that for a service with a 
Medicare payment rate of $100, Medicare pays $80 
and beneficiary cost-sharing is 
$20. If the Medicaid payment rate is $75 (less than 
$80), Medicaid pays zero coinsurance on behalf of 
the beneficiary; if the Medicaid payment rate is $90, 
Medicaid pays $10; if the Medicaid payment rate is 
$100 (or greater than $100), Medicaid pays $20, the 
full cost-sharing (MEDPAC 2004). 
10. We explored using standard actuarial induction 
techniques to estimate how the changes in 
beneficiary cost-sharing would alter spending for 
Medicare-covered services. However, since the 
change in cost-sharing associated with the various 
policy options was small, on average, induction would 
have also led to very small changes in average 
spending. Therefore, we chose to not include 
potential induction effects from this analysis. 
11. In addition, a total of $238 in Medicaid spending from 
the baseline would also be eliminated and covered 
under Medicare. This change is not shown in table 3. 
Other changes that would occur, for example, relate 
to private insurer costs and profits as well as general 
outlays, but those are not considered either.  
12. For beneficiaries with incomes higher than 300 
percent of FPL, reformed cost-sharing is slightly lower 
($704) than in the baseline ($718), and remains at 
$704 under Option 1 and Option 2 as the LIS options 
do not alter the cost-sharing of this group; total 
premiums under Options 1 and 2, however, are lower 
than those under reformed cost-sharing because 
Medigap and ESI premiums are based on average 
plan costs across all beneficiaries.  
13. Although we assume that the benefit package for 
Medicare Advantage enrollees remains unchanged 
and therefore there are no changes in their cost-
sharing, low-income Medicare Advantage enrollees 
could still be eligible for premium subsidies in Part B 
and Part D (if their Medicare Advantage plan does not 
provide prescription drug coverage). Under our 
simulation, Medicare Advantage enrollees would 
receive an increase of $135 (an increase of $244 for 
Medicare and a decrease of $109 for Medicaid) per 
enrollee in premium subsidies.  
14. Our sample represents 31.2 million 
noninstitutionalized fee-for-service enrollees and 6.0 
million noninstitutionalized Medicare Advantage 
enrollees, and the total increase in public spending is 
calculated as 31.2 million multiplied by $266 for fee-
for-service beneficiaries and 6.0 million multiplied by 
$135 for Medicare Advantage enrollees, or about 
$9.1 billion in total.  
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